Using firm age as a proxy for the learning process within a firm, we show that the investments of young firms react more aggressively to profit realizations than the investments of mature firms.
Introduction
New businesses account for a significant portion of the economy. In our sample of COMPUSTAT firms, there is typically more than a quarter of U.S. businesses each year that are either less than six years old or newly restructured by major investments that changed their capital stock by more than 75 percent. 1 This proportion of "young" businesses has evolved through time. From 1990 to 1994, about 24 percent of U.S. businesses were either less than six years old or newly restructured by major investments. In the new economy of the 1995-1999 period, there were about 29 percent such young businesses. Even in the aftermath of the technology "bubble" from 2000 to 2004, there was still a greater portion (28 percent) of new businesses than a decade earlier.
The empirical literature on corporate investments is focused primarily on established businesses. 2 All results from this literature may not necessarily apply to young businesses. In contrast to established businesses, young businesses may not fully know about their long-run prospects. Young businesses learn with time, and meanwhile they invest to the best of their knowledge. The learning process of young businesses may produce investments that differ from those of established businesses. There is indeed some evidence that young businesses behave differently. For example, Evans (1987) and Hall (1987) document that young businesses grow faster and are more volatile. Taking these considerations in mind, we study an environment in which young businesses learn about their long-run profitability and grow their assets. First, we investigate how young firms may invest differently than older firms in response to similar profit realizations. Second, we investigate whether economic environments with less uncertainty facilitate young firms' inferences about their longrun prospects as detected by their investment responses. Finally, we recognize that younger firms 1 These statistics are computed from the universe of COMPUSTAT manufacturing firms for balanced panels during the 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004 periods , and excluding firms with negative operating income before depreciation, firms with net property plant and equipment less than two million, and firms with negative total assets values or negative sales values.
2 For example, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimate important capital adjustment costs for the sample of large manufacturing plants operating continually between 1972 and 1988 . Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2009 find that investment models based on Hayashi (1982) or decreasing returns to scale in production best fit the data based on a balanced COMPUSTAT sample from 1981 to 2003. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) first documented cash flow effects on investments using a balanced panel of firms from 1969 to 1984. may be more financially constrained and investigate how such a constraint limits their investment behavior.
Our investigation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we derive theoretical predictions from a dynamic Tobin's q framework, where firms decide how much to invest each period to maximize the expected discounted sum of future payouts. In this neoclassical setting, a firm's current profit is determined by its capital stock and its productivity level. While firms observe their productivity levels, young firms cannot yet distinguish between the different components of their productivity.
They cannot distinguish their long-run quality from the short-run shocks. Similar to Jovanovic (1982) and Alti (2003) , firms learn with time about their long-run quality as they observe profit realizations, and they invest accordingly. In the second step, we test the theoretical predictions using firm-level data from 1990 to 2004. We observe the effect of learning on firms' investment responses to profits, where firm age proxies for the learning process. In all empirical tests, we also account for possible errors in measuring Tobin's q using Erickson and Whited's (2000) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation model.
Our first theoretical prediction describes the difference in investment-to-profit responses between young and mature firms. As in Alti (2003) , we present a model where young firms infer their longrun prospects from current profit realizations, and consequently invest more aggressively in response to higher profit realizations than older firms do. As firms mature, they learn about their long-run quality and temper their inferences from current profit realizations. With time, their investments become less responsive to profit shocks. Through this learning process, the model endogenously generates more volatility in the investments of younger firms.
The test of the first theoretical prediction generates a new empirical finding relating firm age to firms' investment-to-profit responses. We find that young firms invest more aggressively in response to profit realizations than mature firms do. This new empirical finding is consistent with our theoretical prediction and those of Alti (2003) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) . 3 Our second theoretical prediction shows that firms' investment response to profits is affected by the volatility of the underlying economic environment. Young firms operating in volatile industries have a harder time inferring their long-term productivity from all the industry uncertainty. They observe profit realizations that contain more noise and less signal, and therefore attach less weight to the observed profit realizations when deciding how much to invest.
The test of the second theoretical prediction recognizes that firms operating in industries characterized by a higher intensity of research and development (R&D) activity face more technical uncertainty. Controlling for firm age, we find that firms operating in such volatile industries have investments that respond less to profits. In contrast, firms operating in less volatile industries benefit from more precise information, and they invest more aggressively in response to profits.
Our third theoretical prediction warns that a firm's financial status can affect its investment response to profits. Controlling for financial constraints is important because young firms may be more likely to be financially constrained than mature firms. Our model is similar to Jovanovic (1982) and Alti (2003) , except that it uses a discrete-time Bayesian learning environment with financial constraints. In the model-simulated data, the response of investment to profits is lower for more financially constrained firms. Because constrained firms do not have access to external markets, they behave more prudently than unconstrained firms. Constrained firms invest more than unconstrained firms in times of low productivity so as to insure a minimum level of profits for financial self-reliance. This constrained behavior translates into a lower overall response of investment to profits.
The test of the third theoretical prediction qualifies the importance of financial constraints. We control for financial constraints using Whited and Wu's (2006) index. The response of investment to profits in the COMPUSTAT data is not typically different for more constrained firms than less constrained firms. The difference in responses arises only for the group of young firms operating to profits. Using a small sample of 120 firms during the 1977 to 1983 period, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) find that the younger of the 120 firms have investment-to-profit responses that are similar to those of older firms.
in more volatile industries. The results suggest that financial constraints do not significantly affect mature firms or firms operating in less volatile industries.
Moreover, we find that the first two theoretical predictions and empirical results are not influenced by financial constraints. When controlling for financial constraints, we verify theoretically and empirically that young firms still invest more aggressively in response to profits than mature firms, and firms in low-volatility industries still invest more aggressively in response to profits than firms in high-volatility industries.
We demonstrate the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we show that the response of investment to profits of young firms decreases consistently as we expand the age cutoff defining young firms. Second, we identify highly volatile industries alternatively using newer industries and our results remain qualitatively the same. Third, we identify financially constrained firms alternatively using Cleary's (1999) index and our results remain qualitatively the same.
Our learning results are derived from a simple information environment. All information is public and anyone can learn by observing profit realizations. Managers neither have an informational advantage (as in Myers and Majluf, 1984) , nor do they learn about the firm prospects from investors' information embedded in stock prices (as in Dow and Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) . Regarding the latter information structure, the empirical evidence linking private information measures to the response of investment to stock prices is abundant. For example, see Bakke and Whited (2008) , Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) , and Luo (2005) . Our results linking firm age to the response of investment to profits complement this related learning literature.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 discusses the theoretical predictions. Section 4 describes the empirical data. Section 5 reports the results and all robustness checks. The last section concludes.
The Model
The model builds on Tobin's q framework in an environment that is dynamic and stochastic, with an infinite horizon and discrete time periods. To maximize its value, a firm must decide how much to invest I t every period. Before making its decision, the firm observes the capital stock K t and the random shock θ t that give rise to profits Π(K t ; θ t ). The firm also faces capital adjustment costs Ψ(I t , K t ). The firm's intertemporal problem can be written as
subject to the sources and uses of funds equation
where r is the deterministic discount rate and D t denotes the dividend.
The profit function,
exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital 0 < α < 1, where F represents expenses.
The standard capital accumulation equation, according to which this period's investment I t takes one period to build into the capital stock K t+1 , is:
where δ is the depreciation rate. Tobin's marginal q t is the multiplier on the capital accumulation constraint, i.e., the shadow price of capital.
Following the production-based conditional asset pricing model of Cochrane (1991) , we specify the capital adjustment cost function as
where a is the capital adjustment cost parameter.
We augment the above standard Tobin's q framework with learning. Firms can observe the shock θ t , which is given by
where z t follows a mean-reverting process
For simplicity, a firm's long-run qualityτ is assumed to be high τ H or low τ L . 4 Firms cannot directly observe their quality. At inception, firms assign equal probabilities of being high or low quality.
Firms infer current shocks θ t from profit realizations Π(K t ; θ t ), and they update beliefs about their quality. Using Bayes' rule, the probability that a firm is high quality given the information at time t is:
where φ(·) is the standard normal probability density function. The numerator is the product of b t−1 , the probability that the firm is high quality at time t − 1, and the probability that the current shock z t is drawn from the high quality process. The denominator is the probability of observing the current shock z t from either the low quality process or the high quality process.
The above learning model describes firms without financial constraints. To describe constrained firms, we add a constraint to the model. In its extreme form, financial constraints can be viewed as a barrier from accessing external financial markets. Payouts must flow from the firm to its claimants (D t ≥ 0), ruling out any equity issues flowing from claimants to the firm (D t < 0).
The Euler equations characterizing the solutions for the constrained and unconstrained firms are:
4 In reality, there may be a continuum of possible values for a firm's quality, with firms in the lower tail of the distribution being more likely to exit. For our purpose, we can abstract from entry and exit issues and concentrate on the partial equilibrium setting where both the high type (τ H ) and the low type (τ L ) are assumed to be economically viable.
where λ is the financial constraint multiplier, and the superscripts c and u identify constrained and unconstrained firms.
The constrained and unconstrained models cannot be solved analytically, but the solutions are obtained using the numerical method described in the appendix. We calibrate the models following Gomes (2001) . We set the intertemporal discount factor at r = 0.065, reflecting the average real interest rate during the last century. The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.12, and the capital share is calibrated to α = 0.3. We set the adjustment cost parameter to a = 0.5, which approximates the value of 0.455 estimated by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) . The persistence of the stochastic shock process is set to ρ = 0.62. For the volatility, we are interested in considering two environments: σ = 0.12 for low-volatility and σ = 0.35 for high-volatility. For the two types of long-run quality, we use τ H = 0.25 and τ L = −0.25.
Each of the two models (for constrained and unconstrained firms) is solved under the two alternative calibrations (low-volatility σ = 0.12 and high-volatility σ = 0.35). We simulate series for key variables, including the productivity shock θ, capital stock K, investment I, profits Π, firm value V , and Tobin's average Q = V /K. Under each calibration and model, we simulate 2,000 series for 500 periods. From the first 1,000 simulated series, we keep the first five periods and designate this sample belonging to young firms. From the other 1,000 simulated series, we keep the last five periods and designate this sample belonging to mature firms. The sample therefore consists of eight groups of firms, based on all combinations of firm age, industry volatility, and financial status.
Theoretical Predictions
Using the simulated panel of firms, we estimate the standard investment regression specification:
The row vector z it contains a constant, dummy variables identifying young firms, low-volatility industries, and unconstrained firms, as well as eight profit terms Π(K t , θ t )/K t associated with the eight different groups of firms.
Investment I t /K t and profits Π t /K t are realized within the same period, while Tobin's Q t−1 is measured at the beginning of the period. Including the current Tobin's Q t = V t /K t+1 would introduce an endogeneity problem as the firm value V t takes into account the firm's investment I t decision. Because of the lag, Tobin's Q t−1 does not capture the most current information, so that current profits Π t /K t become a significant explanatory variable for investment.
In fact, the behavior of young firms is more volatile than that of mature firms. For example, beginning-of-the-period Tobin's average Q can be expressed as
or
A firm starts with equal beliefs of being high or low quality. Each period it observes a profit realization and updates its beliefs about its long-run quality. Beliefs become more accurate with each realization, and the uncertainty about the firm's quality decreases over time. In other words, with the gradual flow of information brought by profit realizations, the belief of being a certain quality converges to its true probability. The younger a firm is, the further away the belief b t−1 is from the true probability which is either zero or one. Equation (13) shows that those beliefs weigh in the numerator of Q t−1 . They introduce more volatility in Tobin's Q for young firms than for mature firms. Table I presents results from a regression specification with profit realizations grouped by firm age only. More specifically, the explanatory variables include a constant, Tobin's average Q, a dummy for young firms, and two profit terms associated with young and mature firms. The profit coefficient for young firms is larger (0.224) than the coefficient for mature firms (0.144),
indicating that young firms react more aggressively to profit realizations than mature firms. The panel-corrected standard errors reported in parenthesis indicate that the two investment-to-profit responses are statistically different from zero. The difference in responses between young and mature firms, evaluated using an F-test, is also statistically significant. Table II presents results from a specification with profit realizations grouped by age and industry volatility. Explanatory variables include a constant, Tobin's average Q, two dummies identifying young firms and low-volatility industries, as well as four profit terms associated with the four groups of firms based on firm age and industry volatility. Controlling for age, we find that firms operating in high-volatility industries invest less aggressively in response to profit realizations than firms operating in low-volatility industries. The coefficients for high-volatility versus low-volatility industries are 0.268 < 0.429 for young firms, and 0.189 < 0.361 for mature firms.
Compared to a low-volatility environment, the high-volatility calibration increases the variance of all simulated series. Not surprisingly, the variance of profits Π(K t ; θ t )/K t increases the most, as the volatility affects the productivity θ t directly. Firms of a similar age operating in a more volatile environment observe profit realizations containing more noise and less signal. They have a harder time distinguishing whether larger profit realizations are due to being of a high productivity quality τ H or to receiving larger shocks σ t . These firms therefore attach a lower weight to profits in determining their investments. As a consequence, the investment-to-profit response is smaller for firms operating in more volatile environments.
Controlling for volatility, Table II also shows that young firms still have profit coefficients that are larger than those of mature firms. Restated differently, the coefficients for young versus mature firms are 0.429 > 0.361 in low-volatility industries, and 0.268 > 0.189 in high-volatility industries. Table III presents results from the full specification with profit realizations grouped by age, industry volatility, and financial status. Explanatory variables include a constant, Tobin's average Q, three dummies identifying young firms, low-volatility industries, and unconstrained firms, as well as eight profit terms associated with the eight groups of firms based on firm age, industry volatility, and financial status. Constrained firms of similar age and industry volatility invest less aggressively in response to profits than unconstrained firms of the same age and industry volatility. Constrained firms must self-finance their operating expenses at all times because they cannot raise external funds. Constrained firms therefore stock-pile capital when facing periods of low productivity so as to insure a minimum level of operating revenues that will cover their given expenses. The investment in low profit periods dampens constrained firms' overall positive response of investment to profits. As a result, the investment-to-profit response of constrained firms is lower. 
Data
We test the above theoretical predictions on firm age, industry volatility, and financial status in the data. Because the firm age proxy for learning is central to our interest, it must be measured as accurately as possible. We measure firm age from the foundation date. We hand-collect foundation dates from four sources. Foundation dates were mostly determined from 10-K forms (10-KSB or 20-F for the non-U.S. firms) filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. We adjust the firm age proxy to recognize that older firms may undertake a large project where learning takes place. We measure firm age more generally as the age of a major project. Firm age is reset to zero in a given year if the firm has experienced a change in capital stock of more than 75 percent from the previous year. 7 To test the firm age prediction, firms are divided into two groups, where young firms are at most five years from inception or from a major change in capital stock.
All other firms are considered mature.
As described in the model, the firm-specific component of the shock process θ t is the long-run productivity qualityτ . The volatility σ of the shock process is industry-specific. While each firm may receive a different shock t , the volatility parameter is the same for all firms in an industry.
We therefore use industry-level data to classify firms into high-volatility or low-volatility economic environments. We measure the industry volatility using the median intensity of R&D expenses in a given industry. Industries with more R&D activity naturally face more technical uncertainty.
Each year we rank the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries by the intensity of R&D expenses of the median firm in each industry. The 24 industries with the lowest R&D intensity are considered low-volatility, and the other half are considered high-volatility.
We control for firms' financial constraint status using Whited and Wu's (2006) High values of the index are associated with firms more likely to be financially constrained and facing higher costs of external financing. We compute the index for each observation in our sample and rank firms in each cross section by their index values. The firms with index values in the lower half of the distribution are identified as less-constrained, while firms with index values in the higher half are identified as more-constrained.
Furthermore, we recognize the empirical literature documenting a different investment behavior for firms in economic distress. 8 Distressed firms are identified using a dummy for negative operating income before depreciation. Distressed firms are therefore excluded from the eight groups of firms formed based on firm age, industry volatility, and financial constraint.
The sample consists of all North American COMPUSTAT firms in the annual files with available data on the variables described above. The sample must meet three additional data requirements.
The first requirement applies to the time period. We are interested in all firms since 1990 that have sufficient data for the construction of the regression variables and the variables used to classify firms into the different groups. 9 The regression variables are measured as follows: investment I/K by capital expenditures standardized by property, plant, and equipment; profits Π/K by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation, standardized by property, plant and equipment; and Tobin's average Q by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. As a robustness check, we standardized profits and investments by total assets rather than by property, plant and equipment, and the results remain qualitatively the same.
In addition to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations, we also estimate Erickson and Whited's (2000) GMM model. The minimum distance estimator combining all cross-sectional GMM estimates requires a balanced panel. Including only survivors since 1990 would induce a large bias.
Instead, we construct three balanced panels of five years each: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. To present our main results, we combine the three consecutive five-year panels into one fifteen-year The final requirement covers the industries. Utilities (SIC code 4000-4999) and financial institutions (SIC code 6000-6799) are excluded from the sample. We end up with a large sample: 3,692
firms. A few belong to agriculture, mining, forestry, fishing, or construction (309), some more come from retail and wholesale (564), a larger number originate from the service industry (700), and more than half of our sample are manufacturing firms (2,119). variables of interest include total assets, net property, plant, and equipment, and the long-term debt-to-total assets ratio. The mean, median, and standard deviation are computed for each firm.
The statistics are then averaged within a group of firms and reported in Table IV .
As expected, young firms on average invest more and have higher Tobin's average Q. Young firms are also smaller in size, which explains their relatively higher profit-to-capital ratio and their relatively higher leverage. They operate in more R&D intensive industries and they are more financially constrained.
Firms in high-volatility industries invest more, have larger profits and higher Tobin's Q. Firms in high-volatility industries are also younger, smaller, more financially-constrained, and they use less debt.
More-constrained firms invest more, have lower profits, and higher Tobin's Q. More-constrained firms are also younger and smaller, they operate in more R&D intensive industries, and they use less debt.
Results
The regression specification of Equation (11) estimated above on model-simulated data is now estimated on the empirical data. We also include firm and year fixed effects.
Firm Age
In Table V , we examine the prediction that investments of young firms should respond more aggressively to profit realizations than investments of mature firms. In accord with our model prediction, the profit coefficient of young firms is indeed larger. The OLS coefficients are 0.152 for young firms compared to 0.068 for mature firms. The reported OLS standard errors, calculated following Petersen (2009) to avoid bias due to clustering in the time-series or the cross-section, indicate that the two investment-to-profit responses are statistically different from zero. The difference in responses between young and mature firms, tested using a bootstrapping procedure based on Cleary (1999) , is also statistically significant. The same result obtains in the GMM estimations. The profit coefficients obtained with the three GMM estimators are very similar. In the next tables we therefore report OLS and GMM3 estimates only. Figure 1 illustrates the response of investment to profits for groups of young and mature firms.
The response is plotted against the young firm age cut-off. In each panel, the investment-to-profit response is highest for young firms of at most one year, and the response gradually declines as the young firm age cut-off increases to include older firms. Panels A through C show that this pattern holds regardless of the threshold in capital stock changes (50%, 75%, or 100%) at which we reset 
Industry Volatility
A young firm cannot immediately learn about its qualityτ by observing profit realizations Π(K t ; θ t ) because of the noise introduced by the productivity shock θ t . To further explore the learning mechanism, we examine whether the informativeness of the shock varies across different economic environments. As previously discussed, industries intensively conducting R&D activities face more technical uncertainty. Young firms in such high-volatility industries face more uncertainty compared to young firms in low-volatility industries. With more volatility, a young firm's ability to learn about its own quality is compromised. There is more industry noise and less firm-specific signal.
In Table VI , profit observations are grouped along the dimensions of firm age and industry volatility. Table VI shows that, controlling for age, firms operating in high-volatility industries have investments that are less responsive to profits than the investments of firms operating in low-volatility industries. With a more volatile economic environment, firms have a harder time inferring from profit realizations whether their quality is high or whether they simply received a good shock. For young firms, those facing high-volatility have a smaller coefficient (e.g., 0.149 in the OLS estimation) compared to (0.305 for) firms facing low-volatility. Similarly for mature firms, those facing high-volatility have a smaller investment-to-profit coefficient (0.067) compared to (0.134 for) firms facing low-volatility.
10 In future work, it would be interesting to examine whether the decline in young firms' investment-to-profit responses is related to the activity of venture capitalists. The venture capital boom period of the late 1990's may have assisted many young firms in producing more information, enabling learning, and thereby decreasing young firms' investment-to-profit responses. 
Financial Status
A financially constrained firm may not be able to invest as much as it desires. We recognize that firms' financial status may constrain the response of investments to profits, and we take into account financial constraints when investigating the learning mechanism of young firms. This is important because Table IV shows that young firms and firms in high-volatility industries have on average higher values for Whited and Wu's (2006) index proxying for the degree of financial constraints.
The above results on investment-to-profit responses could be contaminated by the effect of financial constraints. In what follows, we further separate the firm age and industry volatility groups by financial constraints.
We investigate the theoretical prediction that more-constrained firms invest less aggressively in response to profit realizations than mature firms do. Table VII reveals that the effect of financial constraints does not apply in all groups of firms. In fact, financial constraints appear to bind only for young firms operating in high-volatility industries. Only for that group do more-constrained firms invest less aggressively in response to profit realizations than less-constrained firms. For other firms, there is no statistical difference in investment-to-profit responses between the moreconstrained and less-constrained groups. Mature firms or firms operating in low-volatility industries do not appear to be experiencing significant financial constraints as measured by Whited and Wu's (2006) index.
Table VII also confirms the results from the previous tables. As in Tables V and VI but controlling for financial status, young firms invest more aggressively in response to profit realizations than mature firms. As in Table VI but controlling for financial status, firms in high-volatility industries invest less aggressively in response to profits than firms in low-volatility industries.
Robustness
We examine the robustness of our results on a number of dimensions. First, we consider another measure for the volatility of the economic environment in which a firm operates: the industry median age. New industries arise because of newer technologies and products. Using industry age as a measure of volatility induced by the new technologies and products is valid when we also control for firm age. Industry age and firm age contain different information. We note that median firms in young industries are already 15 years old, which is dramatically different from the five-year cut-off defining young firms.
We measure industry age as the median age of firms in an industry. We first classify each firm into one of the 48 industries defined in Fama and French (1997) . For each of these 48 industries, each year we calculate the median firm age using the entire COMPUSTAT universe. Then, we rank the 48 industries each year according to the median firm age and classify the youngest 16 industries as high-volatility industries. The other industries are labeled low-volatility industries.
In Table VIII , we present results from a specification splitting firm-year observations along firm age, industry age as a proxy for industry volatility, and financial status. Table VIII presents results   similar to those of Table VII . Young firms have investments that are more responsive to profits than the investments of mature firms, controlling for industry age and financial status. Firms in low-volatility industries have investments that are more responsive to profits than investments of firms in high-volatility industries, controlling for firm age and financial status. In Table VIII, however, there is no significant difference in OLS-estimated investment-to-profit responses between less-constrained and more-constrained firms after controlling for firm age and industry age. The difference in GMM-estimated responses is statistically significant only for young firms operating in high-volatility industries. It is debatable whether financial constraints measured by Whited and Wu's (2006) index have any explanatory power above the information already contained in firm age and industry age.
The second robustness check uses another proxy for financial constraints than Whited and Wu's (2006) index. In Table IX , we proxy a firm's degree of financial constraint using Cleary's (1999) index. Cleary's (1999) index is based on a probit model of firms' decisions to increase dividends, as described in the appendix. Firms are assumed to increase dividends only when they are in a good financial standing and expect to remain so in the near future. Therefore, the higher the index value, the less likely it is that the firm is facing financial constraints. The index is computed for each firm-year observation in our sample and we rank firms in each cross section by their beginningof-the-period index values. The firms with index values in the higher half of the distribution are identified as less-constrained, while firms with index values in the lower half are identified as moreconstrained.
The results of Table IX confirm those of Table VII . Young firms have investments that are more responsive to profits than the investments of mature firms, controlling for industry volatility or financial status. Firms in low-volatility industries have investments that are more responsive to profits than investments of firms in high-volatility industries, controlling for firm age and financial status. In Table IX , there is only an instance where there is a significant difference in investment-toprofit responses between less-constrained and more-constrained firms after controlling for firm age and industry volatility. The difference in OLS-estimated responses is statistically significant only for young firms operating in high-volatility industries. This confirms the weak financial constraint results of Table VII. Regardless of the proxy for financial constraints, we conclude that for most firms financial constraints may not have much explanatory power above the information already contained in firm age and industry volatility.
Concluding Remarks
Using firm age as a proxy for the learning process within a firm, we find that investments of young firms react more aggressively to profit realizations than investments of mature firms. This empirical finding is consistent with firms learning over time about their intrinsic quality. As firms mature, their investment decisions become less influenced by the profit shocks they receive.
In volatile economic environments where learning may be more difficult, we find that young firms depend less on profits to guide their investment decisions. There is more noise and less signal to guide firms in evaluating their investment opportunities.
These new empirical results are robust to controlling for financial constraints. We show that the results are consistent with a neoclassical Tobin's q framework augmented with Bayesian learning and financial constraints. In fact, constraints appear to be present only in the sub-sample of young firms operating in volatile industries. For mature firms or firms operating in a less volatile environment, our results suggest that financial constraints do not matter.
Appendix

Numerical Method
The model is solved numerically using finite element methods as described in Coleman's (1990) algorithm. We approximate K t+1 and V t by piecewise linear interpolation. The policy approximants are written as linear combinations of the state variables K t , b t−1 , z t−1 , and z t . The coefficients are chosen by collocation, being required to satisfy equation (1) and equation (9) or (10)at all grid points. The solution algorithm is described in detail in Coleman (1990) . The state space grid consists of 81 uniformly spaced points. The lower and upper bounds for the capital stock are 10 percent and 400 percent of the steady state value. The probability that the firm is high type, b, lies between 0 and 1. The lowest unconditional outcome for the variable determining the productivity shock z is set to τ L − σ 1−ρ , and the highest unconditional outcome is set to τ H + σ 1−ρ . We compute expectations using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature rule. For simplicity, t is represented by only two quadrature nodes {-1,1} with equal 0.5 weights.
Variable Definitions
We construct the regression variables following Almeida and Campello (2007) . Investment I/K is measured as Capital Expenditures (COMPUSTAT data item 128) in year t over Net Property, Plant, and Equipment (data item 8) in year t − 1; profits Π/K, as the sum of Income Before Extraordinary Items (data item 18) in year t and Depreciation and Amortization (data item 14) in year t, over Net Property, Plant, and Equipment in year t − 1; Tobin's average Q, as Total Assets (data item 6) in year t − 1 plus market value of equity (Close Price, data item 24 multiplied by Common Shares Outstanding, data item 25) in year t − 1 minus Common Equity (data item 60) in year t − 1 minus balance sheet Deferred Taxes (data item 74) in year t − 1, over Total Assets (data item 6) in year t − 1.
The values for Whited and Wu's (2006) index are obtained from the expression:
where CF is the sum of Income Before Extraordinary Items (data item 18) and Depreciation and Amortization (data item 14), DIV P OS is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm pays Cash Dividends (when data item 26 is positive), T LT D is the ratio of the Long Term Debt (data item 9) to Total Assets (data item 6), LN T A is the natural logarithm of Total Assets (data item 6), ISG is the average three-digit-SIC industry sales growth obtained by averaging the sales growth of all firms in a particular three-digit-SIC category in a particular year, and SG is the individual firm Sales (data item 12) growth from year t − 1 to year t. Distressed firms are those with negative Operating Income Before Depreciation (data item 13).
Foundation Date
We determine the date of foundation by tracing back to the start of a firm's operations. We assume that firms learn from their inception. We therefore determine the start of the learning process within a firm as the start of the oldest segment in a related business. Mere changes in name or legal incorporations are not treated as a new beginning. We use the incorporation date only if the foundation date is not available.
Firm restructurings, changes of ownership, divestitures, and consolidations present complicated situations. We proceed as follows:
• When a firm is the result of the combination of several entities through mergers and acquisitions at different points of time, we take the foundation date of the oldest entity whose business is related to that of the modern firm.
• When a firm is the result of a divestiture from another entity, we determine whether the modern firm started operating as a separate segment within the (divesting) entity before it was divested. If so, we take this earlier date as the foundation date.
• When a firm is organized as a holding of many entities, we take the foundation date of the oldest entity.
• When a firm ceased operations for some period before restarting them again, on the same site and in the same line of business, we take the foundation date of the first period of operation.
We also check that the foundation date precedes the first year in which a firm appears in COMPUSTAT. For all 3,692 firms in our sample, the foundation year either precedes or coincides with the first year in which they appear in COMPUSTAT.
GMM Model Identification
We perform two types of estimations: ordinary least squares (OLS), and Erickson and Whited's (2000) measurement error consistent generalized method of moments (GMM). The GMM specification is identified when two assumptions are satisfied. The first assumption requires that the parameter on Tobin's q, β, be different from zero. The second assumption requires that residuals obtained from regressing investment I/K on the perfectly measured vector z containing a constant, fixed effects, dummy controls, and profit terms be skewed.
The first restriction is easily satisfied: the coefficient on Tobin's q in investment-Tobin's q regressions has been documented to be positive and significant in the empirical literature. The second (skewness) restriction seems more difficult to meet in a small, homogeneous sample of mature companies when fixed effects are considered. Erickson and Whited's (2000) sample is limited to 737 manufacturing firms over four years (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , and identification cannot be achieved with fixed firm effects in their sample. We benefit from a larger number of firms, as well as types of industries, which give the GMM estimator a chance at identification with fixed firm effects. In our larger sample, identification is achieved with fixed effects.
For each year, we perform the GMM estimation using the cross-section of firms. The minimum distance estimator combines fifteen years of cross-sectional parameter estimates by minimizing a quadratic form. 11 This identification test is applied to each cross-section of firms. Consequently, the test produces fifteen statistics corresponding to the fifteen years of the sample period from 1990 to 2004. We report the fifteen p-values of the statistics for the GMM specification up to the third order moments under the five different regression specifications considered in Tables V to IX. Table   11 See Erickson and Whited (2000) for details.
X therefore reports seventy-five p-values.
Overall, the model is well identified. Out of seventy-five p-values, six p-values exceed ten percent. In an unreported robustness check, we exclude these cross-sections in the calculation of the minimum distance estimator, and verify that the results remain qualitatively the same.
Table I. Firm age regression results from simulated data
The table presents estimates from a panel regression on data simulated from the model. The dependent variable is investment (I/K) and the explanatory variables are a constant, Tobin's average Q, a dummy variable identifying young firms, and two profit (Π/K) terms associated with young and mature firms. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parenthesis.
* * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels. The table presents estimates from a panel regression on data simulated from the model. The dependent variable is investment (I/K) and the explanatory variables are a constant, Tobin's average Q, two dummy variables identifying young firms and firms in low-volatility industries, as well as four profit (Π/K) terms associated with the four groups of firms based on firm age and industry volatility. Panel-corrected standard errors are in parenthesis. * * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels. Descriptive statistics are presented for investment I/K, profit Π/K, Tobin's average Q, firm age, the industry median research and development expenses scaled by the beginning-of-the-period total assets, where industries are defined as in Fama and French (1997) , financial status using Whited and Wu's (2006) (W W ) index, firm size using total assets and net property, plant and equipment (Net PPE), and the long term debt-to-total assets ratio. The mean, median, and standard deviation are first computed for each firm. Then statistics are averaged within a subset of firms and reported here in the The table presents fixed effects OLS and GMM minimum distance estimates. The dependent variable is investment (I/K) and the explanatory variables are Tobin's average Q, three dummy variables identifying young firms, firms in a low-volatility industry, and distressed firms, four profit terms (Π/K) associated with the four groups of firms based on firm age and industry volatility, as well as a profit term associated with distressed firms. Firms within five years of their inception or a major change in capital stock (at least 75%) are considered young, while the rest of the firms are considered mature. The top 24 out of the 48 industries, defined in Fama and French (1997) , with the highest median R&D intensity are considered high-volatility industries, while the rest are considered low-volatility industries. Firm-year observations with negative Operating Income before Depreciation are considered distressed. τ 2 measures the quality of Tobin's average Q as a proxy for marginal q. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Constant
* * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels.
OLS GMM3
Tobin The table presents fixed effects OLS and GMM minimum distance estimates. The dependent variable is investment (I/K) and the explanatory variables are Tobin's average Q, four dummy variables identifying young firms, firms in low-volatility industries, less-constrained firms, and distressed firms, eight profit terms (Π/K) associated with the eight groups of firms based on firm age, industry volatility, and financial status, as well as a profit term associated with distressed firms. Firms within five years of their inception or a major change in capital stock (at least 75%) are considered young, while the rest of the firms are considered mature. The 16 youngest out of the 48 industries, defined in Fama and French (1997) , are considered high-volatility industries, while the rest are considered low-volatility industries. Firms with Whited and Wu's (2006) index values in the lower half of the distribution are considered less-constrained, while firms with index values in the higher half are considered more-constrained. Firm-year observations with negative Operating Income before Depreciation are considered distressed. τ 2 measures the quality of Tobin's average Q as a proxy for marginal q. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Tobin's Q 0.078** The GMM specification is identified when two assumptions are satisfied. The first assumption requires that the parameter on Tobin's q, β, be different from zero. The second assumption requires that residuals obtained from regressing investment I/K on the perfectly measured vector z containing fixed effects, dummy controls, and profit terms be skewed. This identification test is applied to each cross-section of firms. Consequently, the test produces fifteen statistics corresponding to the fifteen years of the sample period from 1990 to 2004. The table therefore reports fifteen p-values for each of the five different specifications presented in Tables V to IX . 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Firm age regression results Robustness using Cleary's (1999) index to proxy for financial status Table IX The panels present GMM minimum distance estimates of the responses of young and mature firms for different age cut-offs used to define the group of young firms. Panels A, B, and C present estimates for the entire fifteen-year sample period, where firm age is reset at different thresholds of capital stock changes. Panels D, E, and F present estimates for three subperiods between 1990 and 2004, where firm age is reset when capital stock changes more than 75 percent. The dependent variable is investment (I/K) and the explanatory variables are Tobin's average Q, two dummy variables identifying young and distressed firms, and three profit terms (Π/K) associated with young, mature, and distressed firms.
Year
